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ABSTRACT 
 
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Canadian and Australian 
banking systems have been singled out by some commentators as having performed better 
than many other banking systems, particularly those in Europe, America and the United 
Kingdom. Banks in both Canada and Australia, for instance, have continued to report 
enviable earnings, sound capital levels, and high credit ratings both before and during the 
GFC. The G-20 and the European Union have tried to identify the features of the Canadian 
and Australian financial systems which have underpinned this success in order to use them 
in shaping a revised international regulatory framework. One area of focus has been the 
regulations governing “quality of capital”. 
Despite these apparent successes, there is some evidence that both Canadian and 
Australian banks experienced considerable deterioration in the market value of their assets 
during the GFC. In this paper we use the KMV / Merton structural methodology, which 
incorporates market asset values, to examine default probabilities of 9 listed Canadian 
banks and 13 Australian listed banks in both a pre-GFC period (2000-2006) and a GFC 
period (2007-2008). We also modify the model to incorporate conditional probability of 
default which measures extreme credit risk. 
This paper finds that bank risk was significantly similar for Australian and Canadian 
Banks during the GFC period. This includes an assessment of impaired assets, Value at 
Risk (VaR) and Distance to Default (DD), as well as the extreme measures of Conditional 
VaR (CVaR), and Conditional Distance to Default (CDD); metrics which confirm the two 
countries similarities in terms of a significant increase in credit risk between pre-GFC and 
GFC periods. The extent of this increase was, however, far more pronounced for Australia, 
which was coming off a lower base. Bank risk for both countries was found to be far lower 
than for global counterparts due to factors such as sound regulatory control and low levels 
of involvement in sub-prime lending. This could provide lessons for global banks on risk 
management. A key conclusion of the paper is that it is important that fluctuating market 
values, especially the extreme fluctuations which are measured by CVaR and CDD, are a 
key consideration when determining risk management criteria such as capital adequacy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Canada and Australia share a number of similar characteristics. Importantly, both were 
colonies in the British Empire and this has impacted on the characteristics that each has 
developed. In particular, they share a common head of state. In addition, both countries 
have a similar geography that involves relatively small populations concentrated in a few 
large cities; large areas of each continent relatively uninhabited; and an endowment of 
mineral wealth. But there are, of course, differences. One is the difference of their 
respective locations: one in the northern hemisphere and the other in the southern 
hemisphere with a very large distance separating them. A second difference that flows on 
from this is the increasingly Asian orientation of Australia as against Canada’s 
unavoidable orientation to the US. A third difference is the French influence in Canada, 
which is without parallel in Australia.  
The popular press contains many references to how the two countries are similar 
(E.g.,Sales (2003)). Academic research has also identified similarities as well as 
differences in a number of different contexts (E.g.,Brooks (2009)). In addition, there have 
been fora such as the 2010 Australia Canada Economic Leadership Forum (Canadian 
Australian Chamber of Commerce, 2010) which have looked to develop the synergies 
between the two countries.  
Possibly, the most recent, systematic, and comprehensive comparison of the two countries 
is by MacMillan & McKenzie (2002) who examine how trade, aviation, military, 
constitutional, imperial, and diplomatic relations between Canada and Australia have 
changed during the twentieth century. They conclude that similarities between the two 
countries have underpinned the cooperation and cordiality that is a feature of the 
relationship.  
With the occurrence of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a new area of similarity 
between the two countries has emerged: “the relative resilience of our banking sectors” 
(Stevens, 2009). In this speech, RBA Governor Stevens highlights the profitable and well 
capitalised status of Canadian and Australian banks following the GFC. He attributes this 
to two main factors: the relatively modest holdings of complex securities which were at the 
centre of the crisis; and the more conservative lending practices by banks in their home 
markets. In his concluding remarks, Stevens (2009) notes that, relative to the US, UK and 
European experience, the two countries financial and regulatory systems have “performed 
pretty well … and … are largely free of serious problems” (Stevens, 2009, p. 10). 
Dickinson (2010a) produces a detailed comparison of Canadian and Australian banks 
following the GFC in order to better understand why they had performed relatively so 
well. He identifies a number of factors, including the past conservatism of Canadian and 
Australian regulatory requirements regarding capital adequacy; the lack of compromised 
lending standards; and a focus on domestic lending (Dickinson, 2010b). Ratnovski and 
Huang (2009) undertake similar analysis, but only focus on Canadian banks and their 
balance sheets. They identify similar factors to those identified by Dickinson (2010b): the 
capital regulations which reduced Canadian banks’ desire to take risks; and ample retail 
and depository funding. The benefit of strong bank regulation in Canada and Australia is a 
sentiment also echoed by Smith (2010). Dickinson (2010a) notes that both the European 
Union and the G-20 are looking to modify their banking regulations in the light of the 
Canadian and Australian experience. 
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Given this promotion of Canada and Australia as exemplars of bank regulation in the time 
of a GFC, the current research aims to take a different perspective from the previous 
research by investigating how well banks in these two countries performed from the 
viewpoint of market values. The techniques of Value at Risk (VaR) and Distance to 
Default (DD), as well as the extreme measures of Conditional VaR (CVaR), and 
Conditional Distance to Default (CDD) are used here. The next section of the paper 
provides background information on the banking industry in Australia and Canada. Section 
2 deals with data and methodology. Section 3 covers the results and discussion, with 
conclusions provided in Section 4. 
1.1. The Banking Industry in Australia and Canada 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) regulates all Authorised Deposit-
taking Institutions (ADI’s) in Australia.  As per statistics from APRA (2009) and the RBA 
(2009a), ADI’s comprise  58 banks, 11 building societies, and 129 credit unions.  Of the 
58 banks, 13 are Australian owned comprising 88 % of total bank assets). The remainder 
are subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks comprising 12 % of total bank assets). The 
industry is dominated by the four major banks, which comprise approximately 75 % of 
ADI’s total assets. These banks include Westpac, the Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Corporation (ANZ), the National Australia Bank (NAB), and the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (CBA). These figures include the assets of St. George Bank and the Bank of 
Western Australia (BankWest) who have recently merged with Westpac and CBA 
respectively.  
The Canadian Bank regulator is the Office of the Canadian Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OSFI). Figures provided by the OSFI (2009) show Canada has a total of 78 
banks with assets totalling USD $3 trillion. 22 of these are domestic banks, with the others 
being primarily branches of foreign banks. Of the 22 domestic banks, 9 are public 
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The ‘Big 5’ banks (Royal Bank of 
Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, and Canadian 
Imperial Bank) have total assets of USD $2.4 trillion, approximately 80% of the total 
Canadian domestic banking market.  
Table 1 shows Australian and Canadian banks continue to grow total assets at a similar 
rate over the GFC period. Total assets in Australian banks doubled over the past 5 years, a 
slightly higher growth rate than for Canada, whereas impaired assets showed a fivefold 
increase. However, because this is off a low base of 0.19%, the peak of 0.95% is very low 
in comparison to international standards. Canadian banks more than doubled their increase 
in impaired assets from 0.4% to 0.9%. This is a much smaller increase than Australia, but 
off a higher base. Indeed, Canada’s impaired assets, whilst increasing during the GFC, are 
at lower levels than those of the early 2000’s following the tech-stock crash and the 
terrorist attacks in the US. In comparison to Australia and Canada, the US (Federal 
Reserve Bank, 2009) and UK (Bank of England, 2009) showed delinquency rates more 
than trebling from 2007 to 2009 from 2.4% to 8.8% and from 2.1% to 6.6% respectively.  
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Table 1. Key Growth and Risk Indicators for Australian Banks  
 
Figures are calculated from RBA Statistics (2009b) for all banks operating in Australia. Building Societies 
and Credit Unions are not included. Impaired assets refer to non-accrual assets and restructured assets both 
on- and off-balance sheet, plus any assets acquired through the enforcement of security conditions. Non-
accrual assets have income which may no longer be accrued ahead of its receipt because there is doubt about 
the ultimate collectability of principal and/or interest. Restructured assets have been modified to provide for 
concessions of interest or principal exposures. Impaired assets for Canada are calculated as impaired loans 
and advances as presented in the financial statements compared to total loans and advances as presented on 
the face of the balance sheet. Impaired assets for Canada follow a similar definition to those for Australia. 
Canadian total assets and impaired assets are for all banks classified as domestic as obtained from the OSFI 
(2009). Figures were either taken at the quarterly reporting date shown in column 1 or the closest reporting 
date to it. For comparison purposes, amounts are all in USD. 
 
Tier 1 and total capital ratios for both countries in Table 2 are well above the regulatory 
requirements of 4% and 8% respectively. Total equity ratio (shareholders funds to total 
assets) is substantially lower than the total capital ratio for both countries, in line with their 
high housing loan component which attracts a lower risk weighting than commercial 
borrowers. The equity ratio of just over 6% for Australian banks in 2008 is slightly higher 
than the 5.2% for Canadian banks, with both countries being substantially higher than the 
collective ratio of 3.5% for European banks, but somewhat lower than in the 7.1% for the 
US.  Equity ratios in all cases are calculated as total shareholder equity / total assets as 
obtained from Datastream. The differential of approximately 3% between risk-weighted 
and absolute capital ratios for Australia is lower than Canada, with Canada’s differential of 
6% being similar to other global regions. In Australia, APRA has generally taken a 
conservative approach to risk weighting assets, for example, applying a higher risk 
weighting to higher risk non-standard home loans. 
Table 2. Capital and Equity Ratios 2008 
 
Figures for both countries are taken at quarterly reporting date March 2009, or closest reporting date to it. 
Tier 1 and Total Capital figures are as reported by the banks in accordance with Basel requirements. 
Total 
assets 
($bn)
Impaired 
assets (%)
Total 
assets 
($bn)
Impaired 
assets (%)
Mar-2000 989           0.6 1,431        1.1
Mar-2001 1,176        0.6 1,577        1.4
Mar-2002 1,153        0.7 1,651        1.6
Mar-2003 1,216        0.6 1,703        1.6
Mar-2004 1,396        0.4 1,754        1.1
Mar-2005 1,536        0.3 1,877        0.6
Mar-2006 1,764        0.2 2,083        0.5
Mar-2007 2,016        0.2 2,375        0.4
Mar-2008 2,463        0.3 2,727        0.5
Mar-2009 2,694        1.0 3,021        0.9
Australia Canada
Tier 1 Capital  (%) Total Capital (%) Equity Ratio (%)
Australia 8.4 11.4 6.2
Canada 11.8 14.5 5.2
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Overall, this section has shown that whilst there have been substantial increases in 
Australian and Canadian bank impaired assets, levels are modest in comparison to other 
major global areas. 
2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We include all 13 Australian listed banks and 9 listed Canadian banks. For Australia this 
includes the 4 major banks and 9 smaller / regional banks (88% of total bank assets in 
Australia). In Canada this includes the ‘big 5’ and 4 smaller banks (over 80% of total bank 
assets in Canada). All data is obtained from Datastream, including 10 years of daily equity 
prices for each bank, together with required balance sheet data for calculating VaR, CVaR, 
DD and PD as described below. This includes daily market capitalisation (used in 
calculation of daily asset values and for weighting banks to calculate VaR and CVaR); and 
annual total liabilities, current liabilities and long term liabilities (used in calculation of 
DD). We compare trends for each of the 10 years, as well as dividing data into a pre-GFC 
period and a GFC period. The GFC period is from 2007-2008 and the pre-GFC period is 
the 7 years from 2000 – 2006 (7 years aligns with Basel Accord Advanced Credit Risk 
Requirements). We use an F test to compare share price and market asset volatility 
between the two countries, testing for significance at both the 95% and 99% levels. 
2.1. VaR , CVaR, DD and CDD Methodology 
Value at Risk (VaR) is widely used for measuring market risk, with Conditional VaR 
(CVaR) providing a measurement for extreme risk. VaR’s use by banks escalated since 
adoption by Basel of VaR as the primary measure for calculating market risk capital 
requirements. The metric measures potential losses over a specific time period at a given 
level of confidence. There is extensive literature coverage on VaR. Examples include 
RiskMetricsTM (1994, 1996) who introduced and popularised VaR, Jorion (1996), and 
comprehensive discussion of VaR by more than seventy recognised authors in the VaR 
Modelling Handbook and the VaR Implementation Handbook (2009a, 2009b). In 
summary, there are 3 methods applied for calculating VaR. The Variance-Covariance 
(parametric) method introduced by RiskMetrics is the most widely used method by Banks 
and is the method we use in this study. It estimates VaR on the assumption of a normal 
distribution. To obtain VaR for a single asset X, all that needs to be calculated is the mean 
and standard deviation (ơ). Using standard distribution tables, and given the normal curve 
assumption, we automatically know where the worst 1% and 5% lie on the curve: 95% 
confidence = -1.645ơx  and 99% confidence = -2.330ơx. When calculating VaR, it is usual 
practice, as used by RiskMetrics, to not use actual asset figures, but rather the logarithm of 
the ratio of price relatives. That is, the ratio between today’s price and the previous price. 
A key criticism of VaR is that it says nothing of  risk beyond VaR. Critics include 
Standard and Poor’s analysts (Samanta, Azarchs, & Hill, 2005) due to inconsistency of 
VaR application across institutions and lack of tail risk assessment. Artzner, Delbaen, 
Eber, & Heath (1999; 1997) found VaR to have undesirable mathematical properties, such 
as lack of sub-additivity. Criticism of VaR mounted since the GFC onset with VaR 
perceived as focussing on historical risk and not measuring tail risk. In addition to VaR, 
this paper examines CVaR which considers losses beyond VaR. If VaR is calculated at 
95%, CVaR is the average of the 5% extreme returns. Pflug (2000) showed CVaR to be a 
coherent measure, without the undesirable VaR properties.  CVaR has been used in an 
Australian setting by Allen and Powell (2007), who find significant correlation between 
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VaR and CVaR in ranking risk among Australian sectors prior to the GFC and  Powell and 
Allen (2009) who use CVaR to show how relative risk changed among sectors since the 
GFC onset.  
As we are examining VaR and CVaR of equities, we weight each bank according to 
market capitalisation. Correlation among assets in the portfolio is not calculated as we are 
not calculating VaR for investment purposes, and do not need to show the effect of 
portfolio diversification. Our total bank figures are based on a weighted average of the 
underlying bank VaRs. The weighted average is a more meaningful figure to compare 
individual banks against. VaR is usually measured at high confidence levels, either 95% or 
99%, with CVaR measured as the returns beyond VaR (5% or 1%). As the GFC period 
includes only 2 years with approximately 250 daily returns (based on the number of 
trading days), for a confidence level of 99%, CVaR would only encompass 2.5 returns for 
each of the 2 years, giving 5 returns in total for each bank. We have thus chosen CVaR at 
5% (VaR 95%), which provides analysis of a reasonable number of extreme returns.  
Share price market risk, which we use VaR and CVaR to measure, is, in turn, a key 
component of asset price fluctuations which are important to measuring distance to default 
(DD) and probability of default (PD) using the Merton structural methodology. The firm 
defaults when asset values fall below debt levels. DD is calculated as:  
T
TFV
DD
v
v

 )5.0()/ln( 2        (1) 
Where V is the market value of the firm, F = face value of firm’s debt, and µ = an estimate 
of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets. PD can be determined using the normal 
distribution. For example, if DD = 2 standard deviations, we know there is a 95% 
probability that assets will vary between 1 and two standard deviations. There is a 2.5% 
probability that they will fall by more than 2 standard deviations. Using N as the 
cumulative standard normal distribution function, PD is measured as: 
)( DDNPD           (2) 
Moody’s KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) is a popular model used by banks to measure PD. 
KMV calculates DD based on the Merton approach, but instead of using a normal 
distribution to calculate PD, KMV use their own worldwide database to determine PD 
associated with each default level. In KMV, debt is taken as the value of all short-term 
liabilities (one year and under) plus half the book value of all long term debt outstanding, 
and this is the approach we use in this study. T is usually set as 1 year.  Using equity 
returns and the relationship between equity and assets, we estimate an initial asset return. 
Daily log return is calculated and new asset values estimated for every day. Following 
KMV, this is repeated until asset returns converge.  
Allen and Powell (2009) have modified the Merton model to incorporate a CVaR approach 
due to the fact that firm’s are most likely to default under extreme circumstances. We use 
this approach, whereby instead of using the standard deviation of all asset returns, we use 
the standard deviation of the worst 5% of returns (which we call CStdev) to calculate 
Conditional Distance to Default (CDD) and conditional Probability of Default (default 
conditional upon asset values fluctuating at the extreme 5% level):  
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TCStdev
TFVCDD
v
v )5.0()/ln(
2         (3) 
)( CDDNCPD          (4) 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Figure 1 compares yearly VaR, CVaR, DD and CDD between Australian and Canadian 
Banks using 3 point polynomial trend lines, with metrics calculated as explained in the 
methodology section. The graphs show risk reducing during the mid-2000’s and increasing 
sharply over the GFC period. Canada’s graphs are flatter, having higher risk than Australia 
earlier on and most noticeably with CDD, and slightly lower on all measures during the 
GFC. The higher risk measures for Canada during the early 2000’s are attributable to 
several factors. In particular, due to high reliance on the US economy, Canada’s markets 
during this early pre-GFC period mirrored US markets to a large extent. First, global share 
markets entered a much anticipated cool-off following a period of very high growth during 
the 1990s. Second, the US Federal Reserve Bank and many other Central Banks made 
several interest rate increases to cool spending and inflation. Third, the dot-com bubble 
burst in March 2000, sending high tech stocks tumbling. Fourth, the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 caused further market decline. Canada experienced problems such as 
high unemployment and volatility in the telecommunications and technology sectors in the 
early 2000’s. It was only after 2003 that markets entered a period of sustained growth, 
which continued up until the start of the GFC. This period of growth and stability is 
reflected in lower VaR and CVaR values in the mid-2000’s.  Using F tests to compare 
volatility in equity and assets between the two countries, we find that differences in all 
four volatility measures (VaR, CVaR, Stdev and CStdev) are significant at the 99% level 
pre-GFC, but are not significant at either the 99% or 95% level during the GFC. That is, 
they had similar levels of risk during the GFC. 
Despite Australian and Canadian banks performing better than many global areas, our 
study shows large increases in bad debts and equity/asset fluctuations, particularly in 
Australia. There are several factors contributing to this. The fallout in global financial 
markets, particularly in the US and Europe, and the failure of major banks such as Lehman 
Brothers and Northern Rock, sparked fears of contagion to all global markets. 
Additionally, wholesale and securitisation markets dried up, making it extremely difficult 
for banks to obtain funding. This was exacerbated by market conditions being very poor 
for raising capital, and by market fears of rising unemployment and increasing corporate 
failures affecting loan repayments. 
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Figure 1  Polynomial trend comparison of Australian and Canadian banks using 
VaR, CVar, DD, and CDD 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper shows how bank risk was significantly similar for Australian and Canadian 
Banks during the GFC period. This includes an assessment of impaired assets, VaR, and 
DD; as well the extreme measures of CVaR, and CDD. These metrics collectively confirm 
the similarities between these two countries: both countries showed a significant increase 
in credit risk between pre-GFC and GFC periods, but the extent of this increase was far 
more pronounced for Australia which came off a lower base. These increases highlight the 
importance of factoring market fluctuations, as measured by the metrics used in this paper, 
into risk management criteria such as capital and provisions. Despite these fluctuations, 
bank risk for both countries was far lower than for global counterparts due to factors such 
as sound regulatory control and low levels of involvement in sub-prime lending, which 
provides lessons for global banks on risk management.   
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